Daily News Editorial

Gota got it wrong

18 November 2016

Former Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa standing in solidarity with his brother ex President Mahinda Rajapaksa says that the previous government’s efforts at reconciliation were as sincere as its war effort that crushed terrorism. Speaking at yet another book launch on the war, co-authored by Major Gen (Rtd.) G.A. Chandrasiri, Governor of the northern province under the Rajapaksa regime and Rear Admiral (Rtd.) Mohan Wijewickrema, who served as Governor of the Eastern Province during MR's tenure, Gotabhaya says that the present government has as yet failed to match what they had done for reconciliation. He goes on to cite the release of 90 per cent of lands to civilians for resettlement and the completion of the de-mining process - which according to him, certain NGOs had said would take 12 years - with the help of the army, to facilitate resettlement of civilians. Rajapaksa also went onto blame the international community and NGOs for failing to acknowledge these efforts and charging the former government with meteing out step-motherly treatment to Tamils.

Well, the results of the January 8 Presidential election does not bear out the claim made by the former Defence Secretary. It is true that much was done in the North by way of physical infrastructure, post war, by the Rajapaksa government, but these were not what the Tamils wanted. They yearned to live with dignity as a proud and independent community. The Tamils in the North did not want to be seen as dependents, living on the munificence of the state. They laid a premium on their dignity and this is what was assailed by the Rajapaksas from the moment the war was won.

To begin with, the Tamil community was made to feel like a conquered race. The victory parades held each year only helped rub salt to the festering wounds. It was as if the Lankan soldiers had fought and conquered an alien army, ala a King Gajabahu, when what was in fact defeated was a committed and a ruthless band of terrorists that was purely composed of citizens of this country. It could be argued that the LTTE received foreign arms and financial assistance. But it was not a state actor that had unlimited firepower and free access to arms and the most sophisticated weaponry. Hence likening it to a “war victory” and holding annual parades to commemorate same was clearly out of place which made the Tamil community humiliated and feel a vanquished race.

There were also other indignities heaped on the Tamils, beginning with the strident tone of Mahinda Rajapaksa when he addressed parliament two days after the annihilation of the LTTE. His vehement insistence that a solution to the ethnic problem will be a home-grown one, rejecting any outside inputs, implying that even India keep out of the way, also stung the Tamil community. This in effect repudiated a solution evolved on the basis of the 13th Amendment.

Tamils were also virtually relegated to the status of second class citizens when Rajapaksa ordered that schools and government institutions in the North stop singing the National Anthem in Tamil at state functions. Things became worse when Tamil businessmen were continuing to be abducted in white vans in Colombo for ransom. Targeting Tamils for abduction and ransom needless to say is not the ideal way to promote reconciliation which the former Defence Secretary says the Rajapaksa regime strove for genuinely.

Devolution of power formed the cornerstone of reconciliation, but Rajapaksa only paid lip service to this need, washing his hands off the matter by delegating this task to parliament which never ever gave thought to the matter. The nationalist pitch of Rajapaksa to the southern electorate, his anti-Indian rhetoric, his close association with fire breathing rabid chauvinistic Buddhist clergy, not to mention his general demeanour that spoke of a majoritarian mindset, certainly would not have been lost on the Tamils.

They say one is judged by the company he/she keeps. Rajapaksa's overtures to the Tamil community would have meant nothing while he unleashed his nationalist blood hounds such as Wimal Weerawansa and Udaya Gammanpila to take apart the pro minority UNP which had all along won the favour of the the Tamil community.

The former Defence Secretary would do well to come to terms with the fact that the former government's reconciliation efforts were not accepted by the Tamils when it dawned on them that what was indeed being played was a ‘double game’, to use a local idiom. Rajapaksa could never afford to abandon his nationalist constituency at the expense of reconciliation and commit political hara kiri. Whatever concessions or largess offered to the Tamil community, by Rajapaksa, like the distribution of valuable items on the eve of the last Presidential election, are but mere tokens.