Ceylon Today Editorial

INDO-PACIFIC ENTER THE BEAR

26 March 2017

When Premier Narendra Modi went to Moscow for talks with Russian President V. Putin, in December 2015, the latter presented Modi with an 18th century sword from Bengal that belonged to the Najafi Dynasty, and according to some, not something that evokes fond memories in the minds of Hindus of India. Shortly after they signed agreements to boost Indo-Russian cooperation in the all important and globally significant defence and nuclear energy fields, besides agreements facilitating Indian companies' participation in Russia's oil and gas sector as well as opening up the energy sector in India to Russian participation. The meeting between the two leaders was dubbed as the 16th India-Russia Summit at the Kremlin.

It began with a restricted meeting between the two leaders.

It was after their exclusive tete-a-tete that they were joined by their respective delegations.

To date, no one knows what Modi and Putin talked about that was so vitally important that their delegations should not know anything about the nature of those talks. This visit came about a few months after Modi visited China where talks did not go beyond matters of economic cooperation including investments in India. Modi added that he hoped his visit would strengthen stability, progress and prosperity in Asia. Since then however, we have not seen any thawing on the political front where India and China are concerned, with China driving hard bargains with President Sirisena and Premier Wickremesinghe for big stakes in Colombo and Hambantota, that can openly mean a futuristic militarist strategy in the pipeline that has unsettling concerns for India and other nations.

Sirisena with no excuses did not respond to an invite from Chinese President Xi Jinping last year in the aftermath of soured relations arising from the new Lankan government's tilt towards India and the US in matters related to the Colombo and Hambantota harbours and airports, and stronger defence related agreements with them.

The entry of the Russian factor, especially after a huge lapse of half a century, is no mere coincidence and hence can be seen not as an isolated issue in Lankan foreign relations but in the light of Russia being a close ally of China. Sirisena's Moscow visit can, therefore, be seen only as a first step towards more approaches from Putin to ultimately alter the status quo in the US-India-Lanka nexus. It will be in Putin's and Xi Jinping's interests to ensure that the US presence in Manila is eliminated and that a US and Indian presence in the North, Colombo and South (Hambantota) is not allowed to take firm root.

This is the underlying significance in a Russian leader suddenly wanting to meet the leader of a little South Asian nation...something that no predecessor of his has been interested in, whether from the then USSR or the current Russian Federation, for nigh on 50 long years. So then, why the sudden interest just when the US has begin sending down roots in Sri Lanka and the UK, France, US, Australia, Japan and New Zealand seem likely to follow suit?

Despite India having major issues pertaining to security with China, Modi on his Moscow visit went so far as to say that "History is witness to the close ties India and Russia have had over the decades. Russia remains one of India's most valued friends in the world. My visit will deepen the cooperation between India and Russia in the economic, energy and security spheres. We also want to increase cooperation in science and technology, mining among other sectors. Trade ties between India and Russia can increase even further, to benefit not only our two nations but also the world." He said all this despite having forged unprecedentedly closer military/security ties with the US and thus sent a message to Putin that India would see him as a factor out of the frame in which China dominates as a potential threat. By Sirisena also going to Moscow despite having entered into deeper defence and other cooperation agreements with the US, he was in fact blunting any tendency Putin might entertain in taking China's side against any future rift with Sri Lanka on issues relating to military use of Hambantota or Colombo.

This dual approach to China and Moscow are obviously ways in which Modi and Sirisena have opted to effect a course change in policy in the light of the fact that US President Trump has obviously decided on a softer stance vis-à-vis any potential confrontational approach to Russia.

We could be hence seeing the beginnings of a quantum shift in South Asian policy stances towards Putin aimed at perhaps persuading him to drop his plans of aggression in the Baltic States and Europe and a non-interference policy in the south China seas, Indian Ocean and Pacific regional states apart from NATO.